. Nuclear terrorism refers to an act of in which a person or people belonging to a detonates a. Some definitions of nuclear terrorism include the and/or the detonation of a radiological device, colloquially termed a, but consensus is lacking. In terms, nuclear terrorism is an offense committed if a person unlawfully and intentionally “uses in any way radioactive material with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or with the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment; or with the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization or a State to do or refrain from doing an act”, according to the 2005 United Nations. The possibility of terrorist organizations using nuclear weapons (including those of a small size, such as those contained ) is something which is known of within U.S.
Culture, and at times previously discussed within the political settings of the U.S. It is considered plausible that terrorists could acquire a nuclear weapon. However, despite thefts and trafficking of small amounts of material, all low-concern and less than (SNM), there is no credible evidence that any terrorist group has succeeded in obtaining Category I SNM, the necessary multi-kilogram amounts of plutonium required to make a. Main article: Nuclear terrorism could include:. Acquiring or fabricating a nuclear weapon. Fabricating a. Attacking a nuclear reactor, e.g., by disrupting critical inputs (e.g.
Water supply). Attacking or taking over a nuclear-armed submarine, plane or base.
Nuclear terrorism, according to a 2011 report published by the at, can be executed and distinguished via four pathways:. The use of a nuclear weapon that has been stolen or purchased on the black market. The use of a crude explosive device built by terrorists or by nuclear scientists who the terrorist organization has furtively recruited. The use of an explosive device constructed by terrorists and their accomplices using their own fissile material. The acquisition of fissile material from a nation-state. President called nuclear terrorism 'the single most important national security threat that we face'. In his first speech to the U.N.
Security Council, President Obama said that 'Just one nuclear weapon exploded in a city - be it New York or Moscow, Tokyo or Beijing, London or Paris - could kill hundreds of thousands of people'. It would 'destabilize our security, our economies, and our very way of life'. History As early as December 1945, politicians worried about the possibility of smuggling nuclear weapons into the United States, though this was still in the context of a battle between the superpowers of the. Congressmen quizzed the 'father of the atomic bomb,', about the possibility of detecting a smuggled atomic bomb: Sen. Millikin: We. Have mine-detecting devices, which are rather effective. I was wondering if anything of that kind might be available to use as a defense against that particular type of use of atomic bombs.
Oppenheimer: If you hired me to walk through the cellars of Washington to see whether there were atomic bombs, I think my most important tool would be a screwdriver to open the crates and look. I think that just walking by, swinging a little gadget would not give me the information. This sparked further work on the question of smuggled atomic devices during the 1950s. Discussions of non-state nuclear terrorism among experts go back at least to the 1970s. In 1975 warned that 'You can make a bomb with a few pounds of plutonium.
By the mid-1980s the power stations may easily be turning out 200,000 lb of the stuff each year. And each year, unless present methods are drastically changed, many thousands of pounds of it will be transferred from one plant to another as it proceeds through the fuel cycle. The dangers of robbery in transit are evident. Vigorous co-operation between governments and the International Atomic Energy Agency could, even at this late stage, make the looming perils loom a good deal smaller.' And the New York Times commented in 1981 that The 's 'origins go back to the aftershocks of the in mid-1972. Until that time, no one in the United States Government had thought seriously about the menace of organized, international terrorism, much less nuclear terrorism.
There was a perception in Washington that the value of what is called 'special nuclear material' - plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) - was so enormous that the strict financial accountability of the private contractors who dealt with it would be enough to protect it from falling into the wrong hands. But it has since been revealed that the physical safeguarding of bomb-grade material against theft was almost scandalously neglected.'
This discussion took on a larger public character in the 1980s after aired, a television dramatization of a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States. In 1986 a private panel of experts known as the released a report urging all nuclear-armed states to beware the dangers of terrorism and work on equipping their nuclear arsenals with. 'The probability of nuclear terrorism,' the experts warned, 'is increasing and the consequences for urban and industrial societies could be catastrophic.' Is an organization which seeks to prevent nuclear terrorism and improve world nuclear security. It works alongside the. WINS was formed in 2008, less than a year after a break-in at the nuclear facility in, which contained enough to make several nuclear bombs. The (GICNT) is an international partnership of 86 nations and 4 official observers working to improve capacity on a national and international level for prevention, detection, and response to a nuclear terrorist event.
Partners join the GICNT by endorsing the Statement of Principles, a set of broad nuclear security objectives. GICNT partner nations organize and host workshops, conferences, and exercises to share best practices for implementing the Statement of Principles. The GICNT also holds Plenary meetings to discuss improvements and changes to the partnership. Militant groups materials on the are a global concern, and there is concern about the possible detonation of a small, crude nuclear weapon by a in a major city, with significant loss of life and property. It is feared that a terrorist group could detonate a, a type of. A dirty bomb is made of any radioactive source and a conventional explosive. There would be no nuclear blast and likely no fatalities, but the radioactive material is dispersed and can cause extensive depending on the material used.
A foot-long stick of radioactive cobalt could be taken from a food irradiation plant and combined with ten pounds of explosives to contaminate 1,000 square kilometers and make some areas uninhabitable for decades. There are other radiological weapons called radiological exposure devices where an explosive is not necessary. A radiological weapon may be very appealing to terrorist groups as it is highly successful in instilling fear and panic among a population (particularly because of the threat of ) and would contaminate the immediate area for some period of time, disrupting attempts to repair the damage and subsequently inflicting significant economic losses. Al-Qaeda According to Bunn & Wier, requested a ruling (a ), and was subsequently informed via a cleric of Saudi Arabia during 2003, of it being in accordance with for him to use a nuclear device against civilians if it were the only course of action available to him in a situation of defending Muslims against the actions of the U.S. According to leaked diplomatic documents, can produce radiological weapons, after sourcing nuclear material and recruiting rogue scientists to build 'dirty bombs'. Al-Qaeda, along with some terrorist groups that seek to establish an in, have consistently stated they seek nuclear weapons and have tried to acquire them. Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear weapons for almost two decades by attempting to purchase stolen nuclear material and weapons and has sought nuclear expertise on numerous occasions.
Osama bin Laden stated that the acquisition of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction is a “religious duty.” While pressure from a wide range of counter-terrorist activity has hampered Al-Qaeda’s ability to manage such a complex project, there is no sign that it has jettisoned its goals of acquiring. Statements made as recently as 2008 indicate that Al-Qaeda’s nuclear ambitions are still very strong.
ISIS has demonstrated ambition to use weapons of mass destruction. Although the chances of them obtaining a nuclear bomb are small, the group have been trying/suspected of trying to obtain a nuclear. In July 2014, ISIS militants captured nuclear materials from. In a letter to UN Secretary-General, Iraq's UN Ambassador said that the materials had been kept at the university and 'can be used in manufacturing weapons of mass destruction'. However, Nuclear experts regarded the threat as insignificant.
Spokeswoman Gill Tudor said that the seized materials were 'low grade and would not present a significant safety, security or nuclear proliferation risk'. In October 2015 it was reported that authorities working with the FBI have stopped four attempts from 2010 to 2015 by gangs with suspected connections to Russia's intelligence services that sought to sell radioactive material to ISIS and other Middle Eastern extremists. The last reported case came in February 2015 when a smuggler with a large amount of radioactive caesium specifically sought a buyer from ISIS. The Criminal organizations are thriving on black market nuclear materials in Moldova. Since relations between Russia and the West have deteriorated, it is difficult to know whether smugglers are succeeding in selling radioactive material originating from Russia to Islamist terrorists and elsewhere. In March 2016, it was reported that a senior Belgian nuclear official was being monitored by ISIS suspects linked to the leading Belgium authorities to suspect that ISIS was planning on abducting the official to obtain nuclear materials for a dirty bomb.
In April 2016, EU and NATO security chiefs warned that ISIS are plotting to carry out nuclear attacks on the UK and Europe. North Caucasus terrorists terrorists have attempted to seize a nuclear submarine armed with nuclear weapons. They have also engaged in reconnaissance activities on nuclear storage facilities and have repeatedly threatened to sabotage nuclear facilities.
Similar to, these groups’ activities have been hampered by counter-terrorism activity; nevertheless they remain committed to launching such a devastating attack within. Aum Shinrikyo The Japanese terror cult, which used nerve gas to attack a subway in 1995, has also tried to acquire nuclear weapons. However, according to nuclear terrorism researchers at ’s, there is no evidence that they continue to do so. Incidents involving nuclear material Information reported to the (IAEA) shows 'a persistent problem with the illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials, thefts, losses and other unauthorized activities'. The IAEA Illicit Nuclear Trafficking Database notes 1,266 incidents reported by 99 countries over the last 12 years, including 18 incidents involving HEU or plutonium trafficking:. There have been 18 incidents of theft or loss of (HEU) and confirmed by the IAEA.
British academic Shaun Gregory alleged in 2009 that terrorists had attacked Pakistani nuclear facilities three times; twice in 2007 and once in 2008. However, the then Director General said the claims were 'factually incorrect', adding that the sites were 'military facilities, not nuclear installations'. In November 2007, burglars with unknown intentions infiltrated the nuclear research facility near Pretoria, South Africa. The burglars escaped without acquiring any of the uranium held at the facility. In June 2007, the released to the press the name of, allegedly the operations leader for developing tactical plans for detonating nuclear bombs in several American cities simultaneously. In November 2006, warned that were planning on using nuclear weapons against cities in the United Kingdom by obtaining the bombs via means.
In February 2006, of was arrested in, along with three Georgian accomplices, with 79.5 grams of 89 percent HEU. In November 2006, the with radioactive polonium 'represents an ominous landmark: the beginning of an era of nuclear terrorism,' according to Andrew J. In June 2002, U.S. Citizen was arrested for allegedly planning a radiological attack on the city of Chicago; however, he was never charged with such conduct. He was instead convicted of charges that he conspired to 'murder, kidnap and maim' people overseas.
Pakistan In 2009, a paper published in 's journal alleged that 's nuclear sites had been attacked by al-Qaeda and the Taliban at least three times. However, Pakistan's military rejected the allegations., a political analyst, said that the nuclear link was 'absolute nonsense'.
Interestingly, all three attacks were suicide and appeared to aim at causing maximum damage and not seizing weapons. In January 2010, it was revealed that the US army was training a specialised unit 'to seal off and snatch back' Pakistani nuclear weapons in the event that militants would obtain a nuclear device or materials that could make one. Pakistan supposedly possesses about 80 nuclear warheads.
US officials refused to speak on the record about the American safety plans. A study by the at titled 'Securing the Bomb 2010,' found that Pakistan's stockpile 'faces a greater threat from Islamic terror groups seeking nuclear weapons than any other nuclear stockpile on earth.'
In 2016, Director said that Pakistan 'continues to take steps to improve its nuclear security, and is aware of the threat presented by extremists to its program'. According to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former investigator with the CIA and the US Department of Energy, there is 'a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan than anywhere else in the world. The region has more violent extremists than any other, the country is unstable, and its arsenal of nuclear weapons is expanding.' In 2015, press secretary said that the US has confidence that Pakistan is 'well aware of the range of potential threats to its nuclear arsenal'. He added that the US is 'confident that Pakistan has a professional and dedicated security force that understands the importance and the high priority that the world places on nuclear security'. Nuclear weapons expert and author of 'Peddling Peril' has also expressed concerns that Pakistan's stockpile may not be secure despite assurances by both Pakistan and U.S. He stated that Pakistan 'has had many leaks from its program of classified information and sensitive nuclear equipment, and so you have to worry that it could be acquired in Pakistan'.
In 2015, former US Ambassador to Pakistan, expressed confidence in the capabilities of the Pakistani security forces to control and secure its nuclear weapons. He added that Islamabad has 'specifically taken into account the insider threat'. A 2016 study by the titled 'Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons', noted that Pakistan's 'initiatives, such as strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security cooperation programs, have improved Pakistan's nuclear security'. United States President has reviewed Homeland Security policy and concluded that 'attacks using. Pose a serious and increasing national security risk'.
In their presidential contest, President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry both agreed that the most serious danger facing the United States is the possibility that terrorists could obtain a nuclear bomb. Most nuclear-weapon analysts agree that 'building such a device would pose few technological challenges to reasonably competent terrorists'. The main barrier is acquiring highly. In 2004, Graham Allison, U.S.
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Assistant Secretary of Defense during the Clinton administration, wrote that “on the current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in the decade ahead is more likely than not'. In 2004, Bruce Blair, president of the stated: 'I wouldn't be at all surprised if nuclear weapons are used over the next 15 or 20 years, first and foremost by a terrorist group that gets its hands on a Russian nuclear weapon or a Pakistani nuclear weapon'. In 2006, Robert Galluccii, Dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, estimated that, “it is more likely than not that al-Qaeda or one of its affiliates will detonate a nuclear weapon in a U.S.
City within the next five to ten years.' Despite a number of claims, there is no credible evidence that any terrorist group has yet succeeded in obtaining a nuclear bomb or the materials needed to make one. Detonation of a nuclear weapon in a major U.S. City could kill more than 500,000 people and cause more than a trillion dollars in damage.
Hundreds of thousands could die from fallout, the resulting fires and collapsing buildings. In this scenario, uncontrolled fires would burn for days and emergency services and hospitals would be completely overwhelmed. The likely socio-economic consequences in the United States outside the immediate vicinity of an attack, and possibly in other countries, would also likely be far-reaching.
A report speculates that there may be an exodus from other urban centers by populations fearful of another nuclear attack. The Obama administration will focus on reducing the risk of high-consequence, non-traditional nuclear threats. Nuclear security is to be strengthened by enhancing 'nuclear detection architecture and ensuring that our own nuclear materials are secure,' and by 'establishing well-planned, well-rehearsed, plans for co-ordinated response.' According to senior Pentagon officials, the United States will make 'thwarting nuclear-armed terrorists a central aim of American strategic nuclear planning.' Is another strategy being pursued to counter terrorism. Led by the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center, attribution would allow the government to determine the likely source of nuclear material used in the event of a nuclear attack.
This would prevent terrorist groups, and any states willing to help them, from being able to pull off a covert attack without assurance of retaliation. In July 2010 medical personnel from the U.S.
Army practiced the techniques they would use to treat people injured by an atomic blast. The exercises were carried out at a training center in Indiana, and were set up to 'simulate the aftermath of a small nuclear bomb blast, set off in a U.S. City by terrorists.'
Is a discovered in June 2010 that is believed to have been created by the and to attack Iran's nuclear facilities. Nuclear power plants After 9/11, were to be prepared for an attack by a large, well-armed terrorist group.
But the, in revising its security rules, decided not to require that plants be able to defend themselves against groups carrying sophisticated weapons. According to a study by the Government Accountability Office, the N.R.C. Appeared to have based its revised rules 'on what the industry considered reasonable and feasible to defend against rather than on an assessment of the terrorist threat itself'. If terrorist groups could sufficiently damage safety systems to cause a at a nuclear power plant, and/or sufficiently damage pools, such an attack could lead to widespread.
The have said that if nuclear power use is to expand significantly, nuclear facilities will have to be made extremely safe from attacks that could release massive quantities of radioactivity into the community. New reactor designs have features of, which may help. In the United States, the NRC carries out 'Force on Force' (FOF) exercises at all Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) sites at least once every three years. The peace group have shown how nuclear weapons facilities can be penetrated, and the groups actions represent extraordinary breaches of security at plants in the United States.
The has acknowledged the seriousness of the 2012 Plowshares action. Policy experts have questioned 'the use of private contractors to provide security at facilities that manufacture and store the government's most dangerous military material'. Hoaxes In late 1974, President was warned that the received a communication from an wanting $200,000 ($1,000,000 today) after claiming that a nuclear weapon had been placed somewhere in.
A team of experts rushed in from the but their radiation detection gear arrived at a different airport. Federal officials then rented a fleet of vans to carry concealed around the city but forgot to bring the tools they needed to install the equipment. The incident was later found to be a. However, the government's response made clear the need for an agency capable of effectively responding to such threats in the future. Later that year, President Ford created the (NEST), which under the is tasked with investigating the 'illegal use of nuclear materials within the United States, including terrorist threats involving the use of special nuclear materials'. One of its first responses by the Nuclear Emergency Search/Support Team was in on November 23, 1976. An unknown group called the 'Days of Omega' had mailed an threat claiming it would explode radioactive containers of water all over the city unless paid $500,000 ($2,100,000 today).
Presumably, the radioactive containers had been stolen from the, less than 150 miles to the southwest. Immediately, NEST flew in a support aircraft from and began searching for non-natural radiation, but found nothing. No one ever responded despite the elaborate instructions given, or made any attempt to claim the (fake) money which was kept under surveillance. Within days, the incident was deemed a hoax, though the case was never solved.
To avoid panic, the public was not notified until a few years later. Policy landscape Recovery The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR), which is also known as the, is a 1992 law sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar. The CTR established a program that gave the U.S. Department of Defense a direct stake in securing loose fissile material inside the since-dissolved USSR. According to, director of 's, this law is a major reason why not a single nuclear weapon has been discovered outside the control of Russia’s nuclear custodians.
The Belfer Center is itself running the Project on Managing the Atom, Matthew Bunn is a co-principal investigator of the project, Martin B. Malin is its executive director (circa. In August 2002, the launched a program to track and secure from 24 -style reactors in 16 countries, in order to reduce the risk of the materials falling into the hands of terrorists or '. The first such operation was, 'a multinational, public-private effort to remove nuclear material from a poorly-secured.' The project has been hailed as 'a nonproliferation success story' with the 'potential to inform broader 'global cleanout' efforts to address one of the weakest links in the nuclear nonproliferation chain: insufficiently secured civilian nuclear research facilities.' In 2004, the U.S. Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was established in order to consolidate nuclear stockpiles of (HEU), and assemble nuclear weapons at fewer locations.
Additionally, the GTRI converted HEU fuels to (LEU) fuels, which has prevented their use in making a nuclear bomb within a short amount of time. HEU that has not been converted to LEU has been shipped back to secure sites, while amplified security measures have taken hold around vulnerable nuclear facilities. Options , President of the, argues that traditional deterrence is not an effective approach toward terrorist groups bent on causing a nuclear catastrophe., stating the wide availability of nuclear weapons makes deterrence “decreasingly effective and increasingly hazardous.” Preventive strategies, which advocate the elimination of an enemy before it is able to mount an attack, are risky and controversial, therefore difficult to implement. Gallucci believes that “the United States should instead consider a policy of expanded deterrence, which focuses not on the would-be nuclear terrorists but on those states that may deliberately transfer or inadvertently lead nuclear weapons and materials to them.
By threatening retaliation against those states, the United States may be able to deter that which it cannot physically prevent.”. Makes a similar case, arguing that the key to expanded deterrence is coming up with ways of tracing nuclear material to the country that forged the fissile material. “After a nuclear bomb detonates, nuclear forensic cops would collect debris samples and send them to a laboratory for radiological analysis.
By identifying unique attributes of the fissile material, including its impurities and contaminants, one could trace the path back to its origin.” The process is analogous to identifying a criminal by fingerprints. “The goal would be twofold: first, to deter leaders of nuclear states from selling weapons to terrorists by holding them accountable for any use of their own weapons; second, to give every leader the incentive to tightly secure their nuclear weapons and materials.” Nuclear skeptics , a scholar of international relations at the, is a prominent nuclear skeptic.
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The letter, reviewed by Fox News, was addressed to U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Stephen Schwartz. Somalia's Ambassador to the U.S. Ahmed Awad confirmed to Fox News on Thursday that the letter 'has indeed been issued' by Minister of Foreign Affairs Yusuf Garaad Omar, whose signature is on the document. 11-dated letter delivered an urgent warning to the U.S. That the al-Shabaab terror network has linked up with the regional ISIS faction and is 'capturing territory' in the central part of the country. 'Every day that passes without intervention provides America's enemies with additional material for nuclear weapons.'
- Letter from Somalia's foreign minister to U.S. Ambassador 'This issue can be summed up in a single word: uranium,' the letter said.
“Al-Shabaab forces have captured critical surface exposed uranium deposits in the Galmudug region and are strip mining triuranium octoxide for transport to Iran.” For the Trump administration, the warning represents yet another potential security threat, as the U.S. Government simultaneously grapples with a nuclear standoff with North Korea, the prospect of a stalemate in Afghanistan and ISIS activity across the Middle East and North Africa. But the letter said 'now is not the time to look away,' urging the U.S. Ambassador to consider the request for intelligence and military assistance. “Only the United States has the capacity to identify and smash Al-Shabaab elements operating within our country. The time for surgical strikes and limited engagement has passed, as Somalia’s problems have metastasized into the World’s problems,” the letter said. 'Every day that passes without intervention provides America's enemies with additional material for nuclear weapons.
There can be no doubt that global stability is at stake.' Awad told Fox News that the letter has been acknowledged by the State Department. The State Department would not comment on the diplomatic letter, but did not dispute its authenticity and referred Fox News to the government of Somalia. Iran was supposed to pull back on its nuclear program under the terms of the agreement struck with the Obama administration.
Osama bin Laden and nuclear weapons Osama bin Laden and nuclear weapons by Wm. Robert Johnston last updated 22 September 2002 Al Qaeda's interest in nuclear weapons has been a recent topic of discussion and a highly relevant one. There is little hard data addressing the question of how close bin Laden's organization is to a nuclear weapons capability. What little data there is has sometimes been misrepresented in media reports. Thus, this review may be useful. Contents.
How terrorists could obtain a nuclear weapon. Evidence regarding Al Qaeda's nuclear program. Radiological weapons. Observations regarding Al Qaeda and nuclear weapons. Summary How terrorists could obtain a nuclear weapon There are three general routes to obtaining a nuclear weapon: 1. Process/produce fissile material, design/construct a weapon 2. Obtain previously produced fissile material, design/construct a weapon 3.
Obtain a complete weapon. In the case of a terrorist organization, the prospects are: Option 1: The processing and production of fissile material requires a massive industrial infrastructure. In fact, the required resources are a national-level undertaking. Besides the financial and human requirements, such an undertaking would require years and would be impossible to conceal. Even Al Qaeda could not undertake this option.
Option 2: This is generally considered the most likely option for terrorists. The greatest difficulty is obtaining the fissile material. Since design and construction of a weapon is not prohibitively difficult, the nuclear states have all pursued strict controls on fissile material as the best way to keep terrorists (and non-aligned states) from a nuclear capability. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in large amounts of fissile material being under poor controls. From 1992 to 1996 in separate episodes smugglers were arrested in various European countries with sufficient fissile material, if taken together, to produce at least one nuclear weapon.
Designing and manufacturing a nuclear weapon is challenging but it is the easiest step. The required physics, chemistry, and engineering knowledge is largely in the public domain.
Individuals with graduate-level training in these fields could design a weapon. As early as 1970 a Princeton graduate student apparently designed a fission weapon with a yield-to-weight ratio ten times better than the Fat Man, the United States' first nuclear weapon. The actual manufacturing of the weapon requires a variety of controlled materials, none as strictly controlled as the fissile material. It also involves working with harzardous materials: shaped explosives and toxic and highly combustible substances. Option 3: This option avoids the difficulties of both obtaing fissile material and developing and constructing the weapon.
It is nonetheless unlikely because of the strict controls that nuclear states exercise over their nuclear weapons-for obvious reasons. These controls include both physical security and internal security. The latter often includes electronic safeguards built into the weapon which make an unauthorized detonation effectively impossible.
There have been reports of poor control over some tactical nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union in the years following its breakup. At least three unconfirmed but specific reported cases of lost control of such weapons exist. Evidence regarding Al Qaeda's nuclear program Evidence of Al Qaeda's nuclear efforts can be grouped as follows: 1. Public claims by Osama bin Laden 2. Court testimony by Al Qaeda members 3. Claimed efforts to obtain material or weapons from the former Soviet Union 4. Documents and materials found in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom 5.
Contact between Al Qaeda and Pakistani nuclear scientists 6. Arrest of an Al Qaeda member accused of plotting radiological terrorism 1. In interviews with Time Magazine and ABC News in December 1998, Osama bin Laden stated that the acquisition of nuclear weapons 'in defense of Muslims is a religious duty.' In November 2001, a taped statement by Osama bin Laden included his assertion that Al Qaeda was able and willing to respond in kind to any attack with unconventional weapons. Prior to the 11 September attacks, the U.S. Had obtained testimony from Jamal Ahmad Al-Fadl in a federal trial of bin Laden et ali for the 1998 African embassy bombings. Al-Fadl testified in February 2001 that he was involved in the early stages of an effort by Al Qaeda to purchase uranium in Sudan in late 1993 and early 1994.
Whether the purported uranium was enriched (making it weapons usable) was unknown. Al-Fadl reported seeing a container bearing a serial number and labeled 'South Africa'. The deal was to cost $1.5 million and hinged on satisfactory testing of the uranium; Al-Fadl's involvement ended at this point so the outcome is unknown.
His testimony cannot be confirmed. In the late 1990s reports of nuclear smuggling from the former Soviet Union were dwindling. However, on 25 September 1998 German authorities arrested Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, a bin Laden associate, and charged him with trying to obtain highly enriched uranium. In late 1998 Arabic media claimed that bin Laden was spending millions of dollars trying to obtain nuclear weapons. Reported activities included: hiring nuclear scientists from Turkmenistan and Iraq; offering money to Chechens and Russian smugglers for nuclear material and 'suitcase' nuclear bombs; attempting to set up an infrastructure for constructing nuclear weapons. Israeli intelligence reportedly concurred that Al Qaeda was trying to purchase a 'suitcase' bomb. The weapon in question is likely that described by former Russian National Security Advisor Aleksandr Lebed.
In 1997 Lebed claimed that the U.S.S.R. Had produced 132 'suitcase' atomic demolition munitions in the 1970s and that control was delegated to the Soviet GRU for use in foreign sabotage operations. Lebed further claimed that following the collapse of the Soviet Union many of these weapons were unaccounted for. The Russian government disputes Lebed's claims, stating that no weapons are unaccounted for and that such 'suitcase' bombs were never built. Lebed's claims could be politically motivated, although a few individuals have concurred with his story. (Lebed was killed in a helicopter crash in 2002.) In November 2001 Yuri Volodin of Russia's state nuclear agency admitted that within the last two years there had been 'a major incident involving the attempted theft of nuclear materials' (as described by Michael Dobbs in the Washington Post, 13 November). Around 14 November 2001 the London Times reported the discovery of notes regarding nuclear weapons design in an abandoned Al Qaeda safehouse in Kabul, Afghanistan.
The reports referred to the use of TNT in an implosion weapon and to thermonuclear reactions. Some sources have subsequently suggested that the information was a spoof. In any case, the limited information available regarding these notes suggests that it dealt with general concepts rather than the detailed design information needed for a functional weapon.
In December 2001 the U.S. Reported the discovery of depleted uranium in overrun Al Qaeda safehouses. The discoveries were linked in reports to radiological weapons potential, rather than a nuclear weapons potential. In December 2001 Pakistan reported that two of their nuclear scientists had confessed to discussing weapons of mass destruction with Osama bin Laden in August. The two are Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid, both former high ranking scientists in Pakistan's nuclear program.
Mahmood was dismissed from his post in 1999 for advocating sharing nuclear weapons technology with other Islamic states. When arrested in November 2001, they claimed to have only discussed humanitarian issues with bin Laden. After a period of questioning by Pakistani authorities, they reported later said that discussions dealt with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In 2002 the U.S. Department of Justice arrested an Al Qaeda member and accused him of plotting to use a 'dirty bomb'.
Radiological weapons Increased attention has been given to Al Qaeda's potential for producing radiological weapons. These would use conventional explosives or other means to disperse radioactive material. Nuclear chain reactions and an associated large energy release are not produced, but radioactive material can be dispersed to produce a contamination risk. An Al Qaeda video tape has emerged in which a canister is displayed and alledged to contain radioactive material. Non-fissile radioactive material is not as well protected as fissile material, and it is found at a far greater number of sites. Materials with long halflifes poses a lower radiation risk; materials with shorter halflifes and higher radiation levels are difficult to conceal. Radiological weapons require no particular technological sophistication; their use would more likely result in widespread panic and limited casualties versus mass casualties.
Media discussion of radiological weapons has been accurate in generally acknowledging that the psychological impact would likely be greater that the health impact. The general descriptions of a radiological weapon given have not corresponded to the most effective potential weapon designs. Specifically, several media statements have referred to wrapping explosives around radioactive material. More effective dispersal methods have long been discussed as possible terrorist weapons. Observations regarding Al Qaeda and nuclear weapons Authorities consider it unlikely that Al Qaeda has a nuclear weapon. It is feasible, however, and must be considered as a possibility. Media reports have been surprisingly incorrect in their assessments of Al Qaeda's weapons potential.
For example, several reports have stated that even if Al Qaeda has fissile material, it is unlikely that they could design a working weapon. In reality, preventing access to fissile material is the only way to prevent a group with Al Qaeda's sophistication from producing a nuclear weapon. The first nuclear weapons were built in the 1940s using a TNT-based explosive and no modern electronics. Today, Al Qaeda has demonstrated the use of shaped charges of explosives more advanced than TNT. Groups with less sophistication than Al Qaeda could today match the design sophistication of the first two nuclear weapons.
Al Qaeda's financial and human resources are sufficient to undertake the covert design and manufacture of a nuclear weapon. Thus, if Al Qaeda aquires or has aquired adequate fissile material, it is very likely that they would succeed in producing a working nuclear weapon.
Public domain evidence shows that Al Qaeda has sought fissile material and suggests efforts to obtain complete nuclear weapons. This evidence does not indicate success with either. Various evidence shows that Al Qaeda has investigated radiological weapons. However, the particulars do not indicate progress toward an effective weapon. For example, some reports concern uranium and other materials with relatively low radioactivity and low biological potential (as compared to some other isotopes).
Al Qaeda's history has shown a rapid increase in sophistication of attacks. Over nine years, the level of planning and magnitude of consequences has steadily increased from bombings of a type typical of many terrorist groups to the 11 September 2001 attacks. Even these early attacks showed long planning beforehand.
On the other hand, on many occasions-some as recently as 2000 and 2001-Al Qaeda attacks have been mitigated or thwarted altogether due to lapses in judgement. Taken together, Al Qaeda's history suggests that it would be willing to use weapons of mass destruction and that bin Laden would seek an even higher casualty count in a future attack. Summary Miscellaneous public domain information indicates that Al Qaeda has sought to aquire a nuclear weapons capability since at least 1993.
None of the information conclusively indicates success at obtaining either fissile material or a complete nuclear weapon. If Al Qaeda comes into possession of sufficient fissile material, it is likely that they could produce a functional nuclear weapon. Evidence indicates that Al Qaeda has investigated radiological weapons, but information on actual weaponization is ambiguous. The mass casualty potential of such weapons is limited, however.
© 2002 by Wm. Robert Johnston. Last modified 22 September 2002.
American authorities managed to foil al Qaeda’s latest plot to attack — via hidden explosives in mail parcels — but the long-term question remains unanswered: How can they ensure that they stay one step ahead of the terrorist group? The good news is that there’s no need to wonder what the terrorists’ strategic and tactical goals are — one need only listen to what their leaders have already told us. The bad news is that we no doubt won’t like what we hear.
Al Qaeda’s leaders yearn to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction against the United States; if they acquired a nuclear bomb, they would not hesitate to use it. Indeed, such an attack would be meant to serve as a sort of sequel to the 9/11 plot. The evidence for those intentions aren’t hidden in encoded communications or classified intelligence.
Quite the opposite: They’re hidden in plain sight. Just as Osama bin Laden issued a fatwa to declare war on the United States in 1998, his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, issued a fatwa a decade later to herald a prospective next stage in the conflict. If we take him at his word, some day jihadists will use weapons of mass destruction to change history once and for all. Of course, al Qaeda leaders have spoken of acquiring weapons of mass destruction for well over a decade. They have had little observable success in achieving their goals of producing a nuclear bomb or biological weapon capable of producing mass casualties. Fortunately, it is extremely difficult, but not impossible, for a terrorist group to acquire a strategic weapon of mass destruction (WMD). Nonetheless, the al Qaeda core has kept at it over the years, in the hopes that time and opportunity will enable it to overcome the daunting challenges in this regard.
What has changed recently is that the goal is no longer theoretical, but operational — a change spurred by Zawahiri’s intervention. Rather than follow bin Laden in issuing a religious edict, Zawahiri chose to release a book in 2008 titled. In it, he resurrects a fatwa issued by senior Saudi cleric Nasir al-Fahd in May 2003 — notoriously, the only such treatise that ever endorsed the use of WMD. Zawahiri adopts Fahd’s ideas wholesale. He uses the same ideas, thoughts, examples, and scholarly citations to reach the same conclusion: The use of nuclear weapons would be justified as an act of equal retaliation, “repaying like for like.” Zawahiri raises key Quranic themes to sweep away all potential objections to the use of WMD.
He offers answers to questions about the legality of killing women, children, and the elderly; the justice of environmental destruction; the morality of harming noncombatants; the tactical prudence of attacking at night; and analyses of deterrence. Zawahiri adopts Fahd’s examples verbatim: The Prophet Mohammed’s attack on the village of al-Taif using a catapult, for instance, permits the use of weapons of “general destruction” incapable of distinguishing between innocent civilians and combatants. The take-away from Zawahiri’s book is that the use of weapons of mass destruction should be judged on intent rather than on results; if the intent to use WMD is judged to be consistent with the Quran, then the results are justifiable, even if they clearly violate specific prohibitions under Islam. The same reasoning is applied in a detailed explanation of such matters as loyalty to the state, contracts, obligations, and treaties; the permissibility of espionage; and deception and trickery. For example, on the topic of Muslims killed in combat unintentionally in the fight against infidels: “When Muslims fight nonbelievers, any Muslim who is killed is a martyr.” Aside from its general endorsement of WMDs, we should pay special attention to two operational messages embedded in Zawahiri’s book.
First, America is a special object of Zawahiri’s attention when discussing a nuclear attack. Zawahiri explicitly ties U.S. Crimes to the alleged need to use WMD, quoting Fahd: “There is no doubt that the greatest enemy of Islam and Muslims at this time is the Americans.” Zawahiri further explains that he considers the United States to be a “single juridical entity” under Islam. It’s a verdict with chilling implications: Zawahiri means to say that all Americans are valid targets, regardless of whether they are men, women, or children. This is not a mere aside; it is a careful choice of words that reflects a seriousness of purpose.
Indeed, he is at pains to prove his judiciousness. He cites a variety of viewpoints from the Quran and hadiths (sayings of the Prophet Mohammed), some of which support his judgments, others which do not. At times, he dramatically prefaces his conclusion with the words “I say ” to draw attention to the fact that his judgments digress from the views held by some Islamic scholars; it is also a way for Zawahiri — a medical doctor, not a religious scholar by training — to assume authority for himself as an arbiter of Islamic law. Second, al Qaeda has reckoned with the horrific scale of a nuclear attack; indeed, Zawahiri sees mass casualties as a point in WMDs’ favor. Zawahiri’s book explicitly justifies a potential attack that could kill 10 million Americans.
Again, that enormous figure is not merely tossed off casually by Zawahiri. He believes that such a plan requires justification, and he is satisfied, at the conclusion of his book, that he has done so. It is notable that Zawahiri repeatedly uses the phrase “artillery bombardment” in the context of discussing the wide-scale destruction of a WMD attack. For al Qaeda, it seems, modern weapons of mass destruction are simply a form of weapon that cannot distinguish between civilians and combatants. Nuclear weapons, Zawahiri wants to argue, are no more morally significant than the catapult often cited in the Quran and hadiths.
Here Zawahiri quotes Fahd once again: “If a bomb were dropped on them, destroying 10 million of them and burning as much of their land as they have burned of Muslim land, that would be permissible without any need to mention any other proof.” Needless to say, Zawahiri’s approach goes against all Western theories of just war. Zawahiri’s dismissal of moral qualms in jihad echoes the words of his mentor, Islamist philosopher Sayyid Qutb: “The Islamic jihad has no relationship to modern warfare, either in its causes or in the way it is conducted.” Zawahiri is a man of action, not contemplation, and his tone leaves little question that he believes the West has not yet been exonerated for its crimes. And like bin Laden in 1998, Zawahiri is not only a cleric but an operational planner — we can be assured that he is planning al Qaeda’s redemption by means of the terrible weapons he champions.
Exoneration is a warning that the rules of engagement may be about to change. We would be foolish not to heed it.
Since October 2002, North Korea has admitted to a secret uranium-enrichment program, kicked international inspectors out of the country, announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and restarted its plutonium program. Pyongyang maintains that it needs nuclear bombs to defend itself against a U.S. In excerpts from their FRONTLINE interviews, William Perry, Thomas Hubbard and Ashton Carter debate how close the North may be towards achieving its nuclear ambitions.
Sec'y of Defense (1994-1997); U.S. Special Envoy to North Korea (1999).The North Korean military understands quite clearly that they cannot compete with the United States military. They have learned the lessons of Desert Storm very, very well. And therefore, they argue that they need nuclear weapons as an offset to our preponderant conventional military capability. And those people in the North Korean military have had a very heavy say in the North Korean government, and I think a very heavy influence in Kim Jong Il's decision. Therefore, based on this history, I conclude there's a very strong motivation within North Korea to go towards a robust nuclear weapon program. And I believe it's quite possible they've already decided that there's what they have to do for regime survival, and will do it any way they can find of doing it.
The North Koreans' that they planned to reprocess plutonium at the Yongbyon facility, and the expulsion of international inspectors was a very clear signal to us that they planned to go ahead and reprocess this fuel, get the plutonium and then make the nuclear bombs. My judgment then and my judgment today was they thought they would try to push the way through to a nuclear weapons program. In a sense, they were testing to see if they could succeed in doing that. But I have to be very clear, we're only guessing what their intentions were. They never told us why they were doing it.
But it was inescapable that they were heading for nuclear weapons when they sent the inspectors out, we believed. I think it's a serious crisis. We're probably heading now towards a North Korea with a robust nuclear production program and a declared nuclear state, including nuclear tests. That seems to me to be the direction that North Korea's headed right now. Do they have a bomb now? I don't know whether they have a bomb now.
During the second or third year of the first Bush administration, we think they did some reprocessing of fuel without inspectors being present. Knowing the size of the reactor they had there, we believe that could have yielded enough plutonium for maybe one or two nuclear bombs. We don't know that they've done that, but we know they could have done it. From that time, since about 1989 or 1990 to this point, which is 13 or 14 years, it's possible that they have had enough plutonium for one or two nuclear bombs.
I'm not unconcerned about that. But one or two nuclear bombs is a different nature of threat altogether from six or seven nuclear bombs, or from making five or 10 nuclear bombs a year, in terms of the threat to the United States. Because it gives them the option for testing, it gives them the option for selling, it gives them the option for still having nuclear weapons left over to threaten South Korea, Japan, the United States. How much time does the United States have? I think we will have passed a threshold in a couple of months. By May, presumably, if they're proceeding at full speed, they could have the plutonium processed and moved out of Yongbyon, moved we know not where, and then, at some other laboratory, they could be making the bomb. So they might have six or seven bombs by the end of the year.
Now, I want to be clear that there's quite a lot of uncertainty about any particular estimate of timing you make here. The processor and the reactor have been shut down for more than eight years, so bringing them back up to speed may take some time. They may run into problems in doing that.
So a couple of months is sort of the early end of how quickly they could move. It could take them longer. But we're talking about months, not years. Is there any evidence that they are selling nuclear technology? None that I'm aware of.
I'm not sure they have much to sell at this point. But if they proceed with, which is now out of the IAEA control, then they will have enough time to make probably five or six nuclear bombs. That gives them enough bombs that they could sell one or two of them.
Ambassador to South Korea (2001-present) You had intelligence that they were shopping in Pakistan for equipment and technology to start a program to enrich uranium. There were some pieces of intelligence that made us believe that there was perhaps some research and development going into a highly enriched uranium program. What changed over just the last, really six months, was our perception of the stage and scale of that program, which took this from being a potential problem that we have to worry about sometime in the future to a much more immediate problem that had to be dealt with. What prevents them from going nuclear? If they don't want to talk except bilaterally and the United States refuses to talk, what prevents them? If they're determined to go nuclear, they're going to go nuclear and then we have to deal with that problem. So there's nothing that the United States can do at this point to stop them?
We think we have offered a dialogue. We have indicated that we'll play a very active role in that, that we're prepared to talk to them about how they can dismantle this program. If the United States can do nothing to stop North Korea, a country that possibly has a couple of nuclear warheads already and can develop five or six more by the end of the year, has missiles that can reach the United States, why isn't this a crisis? Because we believe that this is a problem that can be solved. That we can find a way to enter into some kind of diplomatic process, hopefully on a multilateral basis, that will allow us to stop the North Koreans before they take some of the fateful next steps. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (1993-1996) You've seen the intelligence. Is there any information that leads you to believe that the North Koreans are assisting Middle Eastern countries such as Iran or others in getting nuclear weapons?
Anne of green gables 1987 download. Well, what information I have on that subject I can't share. But what I can say is that North Korea has clearly, in the past, assisted Iran in its ballistic missile program. They've helped the Pakistanis with missiles? That's right. They've helped the Iranians with missiles. Libyans with missiles. Syrians with missiles?
Many countries in the Middle East. Almost anybody who will buy them.
And they're out hawking them all the time. Are there North Koreans helping the Iranians with nuclear programs?
Wouldn't surprise me to find the technical underbellies of these weapons of mass destruction programs in constant communication with one another and working with one another. It wouldn't surprise you to find out that the North Koreans were helping the Iranians develop a nuclear bomb?
No, it wouldn't surprise me. Syrians or Libya? Would not surprise me, no, and it's fine as long as they're only trading blueprints. But when they've got the metal, the plutonium that can make those blueprints real, then you really have to be worried.
This is important because this is, as I understand it, a major piece of their gross national product, missile sales. It has been in the past, a substantial source of hard currency earnings to them. I think the market has tapered off a little bit for them. All the more reason to sell something bigger and better. That's much more valuable. Note: More about How much do you sell a nuclear warhead for? Are five pounds of plutonium enough to make a big warhead?
There is mercifully no market in that. No test has been done.
I believe it's the case that there were rumors 25 years ago, that Qaddafi offered India to relieve its entire foreign debt in return for one nuclear weapon. How much was that? I don't know but it must have been billions and billions and billions of dollars.
And remember that countries that choose the proliferation path spend an enormous amount reprocessing plutonium or enriching uranium. It's expensive to make nuclear weapons. It's a hassle. There are large facilities involved, and you get caught building them. They're facilities that can be bombed, like Yongbyon.
So if you're intent upon getting nuclear weapons, by far the easier path is to buy the material. Even more so if you're a terrorist who doesn't have a country in which he can build a reprocessing facility or build a uranium enrichment facility. Our nightmare, any of us - which would change the way we lived our lives - was if we thought that any moment Al Qaeda might detonate a nuclear weapon in a city anywhere in the world, because we learned that they had gotten hold of some plutonium from the North Koreans by sale. Or when the North Korean regime collapsed, somebody smuggled it out.
Al Qaeda Terrorist Attacks
People talk about containment of North Korea. Well, you can contain North Korea in many ways, but it's not believable to me that we can put a hermetic seal around North Korea that will guarantee us that a little piece of metal this big of plutonium can't get out of North Korea.
Al Qaeda Ideology
That's completely incredible.:::::::::::::: photograph copyright © afp/corbis web site 1995-2014 WGBH educational foundation.
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